Caching popular contents is a promising way to offload the mobile data traffic in wireless networks, but so far the potential advantage of caching in improving physical layer security (PLS) is rarely considered. In this paper, we contribute to the design and theoretical understanding of exploiting the caching ability of users to improve the transmission security in a wireless heterogeneous network (HetNet). In such network, the base station (BS) ensures the secrecy of communication by transmitting the requested file along with a pre-cached file of the user, such that only the eavesdropper's channel is degraded. Accordingly, the node locations of BSs, users and eavesdroppers are first modeled as mutually independent poisson point processes (PPPs) and the corresponding file access protocol is developed. We then derive analytical expressions of two metrics, average secrecy rate and secrecy coverage probability, for the proposed system. Numerical results are provided to show the significant security advantages of the proposed scheme and to characterize the impacts of network resources on the security performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing popularity of mobile payment and internet of things has enabled the privacy and security of data transmission to be an important issue in wireless cellular networks. However, the transferred information may be eavesdropped and jammed due to the broadcast nature of wireless channel [1] . To address this challenge, physical layer security (PLS) has emerged as a promising technology to improve the security of wireless data transmission.
The fundamental principle of PLS is to exploit the inherent randomness of wireless channels to reduce the information extracted by eavesdroppers (Eves) [2] . In the work [3] , Wyner showed that the secrecy of transmission can be perfectly guaranteed at a positive secrecy rate if the legitimating channel is better than the eavesdropping channel. Further, various efficient approaches were studied to improve the maximal secrecy rate by using multi-input single-output techniques [4] , or deploying cooperative relays [5] .
However, in wireless heterogeneous networks (HetNets), the dense deployment of base stations (BSs) makes wireless transmissions suffer severe interference [6] , [7] . Moreover, due to the random distributed locations of Eves, the security of data transmissions in HetNets is facing more challenges. The works [8] - [10] utilized Poisson point process (PPP) to model the node locations of HetNets, and proposed efficient schemes to improve the security of data transmissions. Specifically, the authors in [8] considered an artificial-noise-aided secure transmission scheme, and analyzed the secrecy probability of the user. The work [9] developed an analytical expression of the average secrecy rate to evaluate the performance of PLS in HetNets. In [10] , the authors considered that jammers and users can send jamming signals to confound Eves. By optimizing the selection of jammer, the user connection probability is maximized under the secrecy rate constraint.
Recently, caching popular contents at BSs and users has been a promising technique to offload mobile data traffic in wireless networks [11] , [12] . Caching can also be utilized to improve the received signal strength at users [13] and the secrecy of data transmission [14] , [15] . In [13] , the authors used pre-cached files as side information to cancel part of received interferences, and hence decrease packet loss rate. By properly encoding the pre-cached and the delivered files, the work [14] realized secure coded multicast delivery under different cache placements. PLS in cache-enabled wireless networks has been recently studied in [15] , where multiple BSs can perform cooperative transmission based on their cached files. However, the network considered in [15] is a fixed topology consisting of one Eve, multiple BSs and users.
Note that exploiting the caching ability of users to improve the PLS in cache-enabled wireless heterogeneous networks has not been investigated. Furthermore, no prior work has introduced the pre-cached files of users as artificial interference in data transmission to confound the Eves. Motivated by this, we propose a cache-aided scheme to improve PLS in a three-tier wireless HetNet by utilizing the tool of stochastic geometry, and analyze the security performance of such scheme. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We consider a three-tier wireless HetNet, where the positions of BSs, users and Eves are modeled as mutually independent homogeneous PPPs. We assume that a part of users are cache-enabled and have cached files while the Eves are cache-untenabled. • We propose a novel cache-aided scheme to improve the PLS of the three-tier HetNets. Specifically, when BS serves the request of a cache-enabled user, it can transmit the requested file along with a pre-cached file of the user. This pre-cached file is regarded as artificial interference, and can be cancelled by the user since it is perfectly known to the user. The Eves are confounded by this artificial interference due to absence of this precached file. To compare with our proposed scheme, we also considered normal transmission where BS directly transmit the requested file to the user. • We derive analytical expressions of average secrecy rate and secrecy coverage probability for the cache-aided transmission and normal transmission. Numerical results show that the proposed cache-aided scheme achieves a significant gain over the normal transmission.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe a three-tier wireless cacheenabled HetNet in terms of the network structure and the file access protocol.
A. Network Structure
As shown in Fig. 1 , we consider a general wireless cacheenabled HetNet consisting three tiers of BSs, users and Eves, where the locations of BSs, users and Eves in each tier are spatially distributed based on independent PPPs, denoted as Φ b , Φ u and Φ e with density λ b , λ u and λ e , respectively. All nodes have single antenna and we consider the downlink transmission, where time is divided into discrete slots with equal duration and we study one slot of the system. Largescale fading and small-scale fading are both considered. We denote by d −β the large scale fading along the distance d, where β ∈ [2, 4] is the path-loss exponent. For the smallscale fading, we consider the Rayleigh fading channel h, where | h | 2 ∼ exp (1) .
Consider a file library consisting of N files denoted by F {f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f N }, and all the files are assumed to have equal length L. Each user randomly requests a file f i with probability p i and
Here, we also consider a file can only be stored entirely rather than partially.
We assume only α part of users have cache ability, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The cache-enabled users also follow a thinning PPP with density αλ u . The cache-enabled users have same caching size with (M × L) bits, where M < N. We assume that all the cache-enabled users have cached the same M -most popular files out of F, denoted by M {f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f M }. To the aim of tractability, we assume that BSs can access all the files in F by directly connectting to the core-network, and neglect the extra cost for BS to fetch files. The Eves considered in this paper have no cache ability.
B. File Access Protocol
Let Q be the total amount of request from users in Φ u at one slot. As indicated in Fig. 1 , the file access protocol can be described as follows:
(a) Self-offloading: When a cache-enabled user happens to request a file in M, the request will be satisfied and offloaded immediately from the user's local storage, termed as "Self-offloading". By denoting the cache hit probability of the request fall in
the target file f i can be provided by the nearest BS. In order to improve the transmission security, BS can combine the target file f i with a cached file f m , i.e., f m ∈ M. 1 Therefore, the transmission signal is
where P is the transmission power of BS, x i and x m are the signal of f i and f m with E(|x i | 2 ) = E(|x m | 2 ) = 1 respectively, and θ ∈ (0, 1] is the ratio of power allocation. Since the pre-cached signal x m is known perfectly by the cache-enabled user, the user can cancel the extra interference x m . However, x m is unknown for the Eves and thus can be viewed as interference. We term this transmission as "Secure-transmission". And the amount of this request is Q ST = α(1 − δ)Q (c) Normal-transmission: When a user does not have cache ability and requests f i from F, f i will be transmitted by its nearest BS, termed as "Normal-transmission". The transmission signal is t i = √ P x i . Moreover, according to which subset of f i belongs to, the request can be divided into two types: f i ∈ M and f i ∈ C. Therefore the amount of these two types request are
In this paper, we assume all the BSs work in the full loaded state due to λ u λ b and each BS randomly serves one of user requests with equal probability. Therefore, the locations of BS in different states
III. ANALYSIS OF TRANSMISSION PROTOCOL
According to Slivnyak's theorem [16] , a typical user u 0 locating at the origin of the Euclidean area does not change the distribution of PPP, no matter with or without caching ability. Based on our proposed file access protocol, the request of u 0 can be respond by his local cache or serving BS b 0 . We consider a non-colluding wiretap scenario where each Eve individually overhears the data transmission from b 0 to u 0 . Under normal transmission and secure transmission schemes, the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of users and Eves are respectively analyzed as follow.
A. Normal Transmission
A typical user with no cache ability denoted as un 0 requests f i from F. The nearest BS b 0 serves this request within the normal-transmission. Since the interference signals transmitted by other BSs from Φ b1 , Φ b2 , Φ b3 cannot be cancelled without cached files, the interference un 0 suffering is equivalently coming from {Φ b \b 0 } with power P . Therefore the received signal of un 0 is
where d un0,b0 denotes the distance between un 0 and b 0 , h un0,b0 (h un0,b k ) represents the Rayleigh fading channel between un 0
is the transmission signal of b 0 (b k ), and n 0 ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ) denotes the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). W.l.o.g, the variance of AWGN noise n i is σ 2 for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 in this paper.
Therefore the received SINR at un 0 is
The received signal at an arbitrary Eve e j ∈ Φ e is given by:
Because x i is eavesdropped signal for e j , the received SINR of e j can be written as
B. Secure Transmission
A typical user with cache ability denoted as uc 0 requests f i from C. The nearest BS b 0 will serve this request within the secure-transmission. The received signal at uc 0 is given by:
As described in Section II-B, the pre-cached signal x m is known perfectly at uc 0 . We assume the perfect channel state information is fully available at cache-enabled users. Thus, the (1−θ) part of interference from Φ b1 and fully interference from Φ b2 can be cancelled [13] . The SINR of uc 0 is
2 Note that x k include secure transmission and normal transmission from
For the Eve of uc 0 , the received signal y ej c is given by
Thus the SINR of e j can be calculated as
Remark 1. We can observe from (8) that the expression has the form of
IV. SECURITY METRICS ANALYSIS
In this section, the secrecy performance of two transmission protocols are analysed in terms of average secrecy rate and secrecy coverage probability.
A. Average Secrecy Rate
Consider a link between the user u 0 and serving BS b 0 being intercepted by Eves ∈ Φ e . We focus on the most detrimental Eve which has the highest receive SINR from b 0 . The instantaneous secrecy rate C is thus given as
where x † = max{x, 0}. C u and C e are, respectively, the instantaneous capacity of the user's (u 0 ) channel and the most detrimental Eve's channel, which can be expressed uniformly as C i = log 2 (1 + γ i ), i = u, e. Here, γ e is the instantaneous received SINR of the most detrimental Eve, which is given by
Based on the work in [9] , the average secrecy rate is given by
and can be rewritten as
where F γu and (F γe ) are the cumulative probability functions (CDFs) of γ u and (γ e ), respectively. Therefore, the C of two transmission protocols are given as follow.
1) Secure Transmission:
We derive the CDFs of SINRs at the typical user and its most detrimental Eve within secure transmission in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 as following Lemma 1. Let γ uc be the SINR of the typical user with cache ability, the CDF of γ uc can be calculated as
where
is the Gauss hypergeometric function. Lemma 2. Let γ ec be the SINR of the most detrimental Eve of the typical cache-enabled user, the CDF of γ ec is
and Γ[·] is the Gamma function.
Note that the average secrecy rate within secure transmission is not in a closed form. As such, we present the interference-limited case for the secure transmission in the following corollary. Corollary 1. In the interference-limited scenario, the average secrecy rate for the secure transmission is given by
2) Normal Transmission: We derive the CDFs of SINRs at the typical user and its most detrimental Eve within normal transmission in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, respectively. Lemma 3. Let γ un as the SINR of the typical user without cache ability. Similar to (13) , the CDF of γ un is
Lemma 4. Let γ en as the SINR of the most detrimental Eve of the typical user without cache ability. Similar to (14) , it is easy to obtain the CDF of γ en , which is given by
We also present the interference-limited case for the normal transmission in the following corollary. Corollary 2. In the interference-limited scenario, the average secrecy rate for the normal transmission is derived as
B. Secrecy Coverage Probability
Let R s be a given secrecy rate threshold. The delivery is securely successful when the instantaneous secrecy rate C is larger than the threshold R s . Thus, the secrecy coverage probability can be expressed as
where f γu (γ u ) and f γe (γ e ) are the probability distribution functions (PDFs) of γ u and γ e , respectively.
Note that the f γe (γ e ) is hard to obtain from (14) and (18). We present the interference-limited case for the secure transmission and normal transmission in the following two corollaries, respectively. Corollary 3. In the interference-limited scenario with the secure transmission, the secrecy coverage probability is
where G(γ th ) is given as
Corollary 4. In the interference-limited scenario with the normal transmission, the secrecy coverage probability is
In this section, numerical results are provided to evaluate the performance of the proposed transmission schemes. The BSs, Eves and users are distributed based on PPPs with density {λ b , λ e , λ u } = {1, 5, 100}/km 2 in the simulation. We consider the transmission power P = 30 dBm, the noise power σ 2 = −174 dBm, the path loss exponent β = 4, and the total number of files N = 100, the cache size M = 5, the power allocation ratio θ = 0.5, and the cache user ratio α = 0.5. In the simulation, the file popularity distribution is modeled as Zipf distribution, i.e., the requested probability of the i-th ranked file is given by p i = 1/i η N j=1 1/j η where η ≥ 0 characterizes the skew of the popularity distribution. We use η = 0.8 here.
In Fig.2 , the average secrecy rate of the secure transmission C ST versus the power allocation ratio θ is illustrated. It can be seen that there exists an optimal θ * to achieve the maximal C ST for a given α, and different α has different θ * . As presented in (16) , C ST cannot be expressed in a closed form. As such, we cannot derive θ * in theory. We can observe that the average secrecy rate C ST first increase with θ when θ ∈ (0, θ * ), then decreases with θ when θ ∈ (θ * , 1). This interesting phenomenon can be well explained from (6) and (8) . The increase of θ improves the SINRs of both user and Eve, but the increment at user is dominant in (0, θ * ). When θ is getting larger, the C ST will be compromised due to the growing effects of eavesdropping. We can also obtain that the secure transmission can achieve better optimal C in larger α scenario, because more secure transmissions occurs in the network.
In Fig.3 , the average secrecy rate C versus the density ratio of λe λ b with different cache size M is illustrated. Note from (19) that C NT is only depend on λe λ b which is considered as a baseline. We can see that with the increase of λe λ b , the C is decreased for both transmission schemes, which indicates that more Eves cause more serious eavesdropping. It should be highlighted that, even with λe λ b = 10, the C ST is still above 1.5 bps/Hz which only reduced 25% from above 2 bps/Hz when λe λ b = 0.1, while C NT reduces to 0.3 bps/Hz from 2 bps/Hz, i.e., reduced by 85%. In addition, we can also observe that the C ST improves with increasing cache size M , due to more interference signal can be cancelled with larger ratio of Φ b1 and Φ b2 .
In Fig.4 , the secrecy coverage probability P for various λe λ b is presented. We can observe that P ST is much higher than P NT for both λe λ b = 5 and 0.5, which indicates the promising effect of secure transmission in both Eve-dense scenario and Eve-sparse scenario. Similar as Fig.3 , we can also see that more Eves cause more serious eavesdropping leading lower secrecy coverage probability. The simulation results are presented along with the theoretical ones in Fig.3 and Fig. 4 . We can see from the figures that the theoretical results are in excellent agreement with the simulation results.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we reveal that the caching ability of users can be used to improve the PLS in the wireless cache-enabled HetNet. The corresponding secure transmission scheme is developed, where the transmitter combines the message signal with the pre-cached file. The artificial interference introduced Fig. 4 . The secrecy coverage probability vs. thershold by this scheme can resist Eve, while can be cancelled at the cache-enabled users. Based on stochastic geometry, we derive the expression of average secrecy rate and secrecy coverage probability for the secure transmission and normal transmission. Finally, we show that the secure transmission achieves a significant security gain than the normal transmission.
